https://gunkies.org/w/index.php?title=Gordon_Letwin_OS/2_usenet_post&feed=atom&action=historyGordon Letwin OS/2 usenet post - Revision history2024-03-28T10:17:05ZRevision history for this page on the wikiMediaWiki 1.30.0https://gunkies.org/w/index.php?title=Gordon_Letwin_OS/2_usenet_post&diff=20001&oldid=prevJnc: +cat2018-12-17T01:41:52Z<p>+cat</p>
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</table>Jnchttps://gunkies.org/w/index.php?title=Gordon_Letwin_OS/2_usenet_post&diff=5733&oldid=prevNeozeed: This has been taken from google, but more so to make sure this isn't lost.2009-02-11T22:07:53Z<p>This has been taken from google, but more so to make sure this isn't lost.</p>
<p><b>New page</b></p><div>This is the infamous post by [[Gordon Letwin]] of [[OS/2]] fame.<br />
<br />
<pre><br />
Newsgroups: comp.os.ms-windows.misc, comp.os.os2.advocacy<br />
From: gor...@lab.lwpi.com (Gordon Letwin)<br />
Date: 1995/08/17<br />
Subject: What's happening to OS/2<br />
<br />
<br />
In an earlier posting to c.o.o.a I promised a posting about OS/2's <br />
recent past and future. Originally I'd planned on posting this on Aug 24, <br />
but real life events are foreshadowing things so I'll post a bit early. <br />
<br />
IBM doomed OS/2 2.0, in terms of a successful desktop system, almost from <br />
the start. The folks at Microsoft realized this; we were always amazed <br />
that so many folks at IBM didn't. I speak here not of the faceless low <br />
level drones at IBM but the senior guys who are - for the most part - <br />
pretty smart guys. <br />
<br />
<br />
By successful I mean by either of two metrics: <br />
1) successful in market penetration. To run on enough desktops <br />
that developers would consider writing for it first. <br />
Heck, to run on enough that developers will consider writing <br />
for it *at all*. <br />
2) successful financially. If it turns an acceptable profit then <br />
that by itself is generally sufficient. But note that a <br />
2 or 3 billion dollar product needs to turn a *big* profit - <br />
400 million net, maybe $1 billion a year in gross sales. <br />
<br />
<br />
Sure, the product can be "successful" as an O/S layer for machines dedicated <br />
to custom apps, such as airline reservation terminals. Of course, <br />
*anything* that can support a custom app can be successful in this role. <br />
I'm sure that there are still Pick machines out there. But this role <br />
is uninteresting because it fails to meet either of the two above criteria. <br />
IBM will never earn back even a fraction of the billions blown on OS/2 <br />
by selling it into this niche. I'm not even confident - although this <br />
is admittedly out of my area of expertise - that they can even run a <br />
positive cash flow selling to such a small market. <br />
<br />
<br />
What was OS/2's problem? Why was it doomed? Because it's main attraction <br />
was as an engine to run MS-Windows applications. The problem is one of <br />
standards, and one of critical mass. Standards are of incredible importance <br />
in the computing world. They're critical in other domains that folks <br />
don't often think about. Your HiFi CD player, for example. It plugs into <br />
your preamp. And that plugs into your amp. And that connects to speakers. <br />
Each of those can, and usually does, come from a different manufacturer. <br />
The RCA connectors, and the signal levels themselves, are standardized. <br />
Standardization is a big plus in the computer field. You're much better off <br />
having thousands of products and vendors compatible with a single standard, <br />
even a mediocre one, than having dozens of products, one or two each for <br />
each of a dozen fragmented standards. <br />
<br />
<br />
For example, I bought a Tektronics 222 scope. It has an RS232 port on <br />
it to upload and download waveforms. It came with a floppy disk with <br />
driver software on it. For which processor and OS was the software written? <br />
And what was the disk format? Guess. The fact that it's not hard to <br />
guess is exactly my point. If there were 5 standards for PCs then <br />
that software would cost 5 times as much and it just wouldn't exist at all. <br />
Note that even the RS232 port <br />
itself is a standard. And an inferior one; sending stuff at 9600 baud <br />
over a 7 wire connection is a travesty by modern standards. But it's <br />
a travesty that all machines can understand. <br />
<br />
<br />
So this is the classic chicken and egg problem. Who will buy OS/2 when <br />
it has no apps, and who will write apps then no one has bought OS/2? <br />
A fundimental problem. When Microsoft and IBM first came out with OS/2 1.1 <br />
we expected the 640k limit to drive us over this barrier. The thinking <br />
was that because living in 640K was so terribly painful folks would <br />
upgrade to OS/2 1.1 and buy all new OS/2 apps because the pain was too <br />
great. The knowledge of that reality would cause app writers to <br />
invest in writing the apps, and the feedback engine is started up, if <br />
a little slowly. <br />
<br />
<br />
The miscalculation came about with the 386 coming out sooner than we <br />
expected. And then various folks writing DOS extenders for the 386, <br />
which took a lot of the pressure off of the 640K barrier. When the <br />
386 did come out earlier than expected and we saw what was happening, <br />
Microsoft wanted to abandon <br />
OS/2 1.0 before it was released and work on a 386-only version, one that <br />
would be able to emulate more than one DOS box and do a better job, at that. <br />
But, as you'll remember, Compaq was the first to have a 386 box; IBM <br />
was slow to follow suit. IBM was strong in 286's and weak in 386's, <br />
so they was strongly opposed to dropping the 286 <br />
in favor of leapfrogging to the 386 and they insisted that we stay the course <br />
for the 286. <br />
<br />
<br />
Another problem that came up here was that IBM didn't want us to use the <br />
windows API for the graphical environment under OS/2. Many key folks <br />
inside IBM had always hated Windows. IBM had this crazy thing called TopView, <br />
it was a character oriented windowing scheme and not very good. Bill Gates, <br />
myself, and some other folks made several trips to Boca Raton to try <br />
to explain to those guys why a character oriented windowing scheme was <br />
obsolete before it was even written, but to no avail. One of IBM's most <br />
major problems is that although their top guys may be smart, they <br />
aren't techically savvy. And their low level guys are often neither. <br />
IBM doesn't promote on the basis of your skills and ability; they promote <br />
on the basis of seniority and other secondary factors. So the guy <br />
who makes these decisions often doesn't know what he's doing. And he <br />
doesn't know that he doesn't know, because his peers are equally <br />
butt-ignorant too. So these guys can never figure out how other folks, <br />
including but not limited to Microsoft, keep doing better! Must be dumb luck, <br />
they think. I always agreed that it *was* dumb luck. If you catch my <br />
drift... :-) <br />
<br />
<br />
So the technical guys to whom we made our presentation thought that <br />
a crude character oriented interface (and the other major problems <br />
that I've since forgotten) was good enough. It said "IBM" so people would <br />
have to buy it. And their very senior managers couldn't understand our <br />
argument, and their own folks said that we were wrong, so that was that. <br />
<br />
<br />
Topview died a very quick death and Windows, while not a red hot success <br />
at the time, did reasonably well. I don't understand the internal <br />
personalities, etc., but the upshot was that several key people at IBM <br />
would turn livid at the mention of Windows. So one of the "costs" of <br />
doing OS/2 with IBM was - as a form of punishment - that OS/2 would <br />
*not* have a windows API. The windowing API, in fact, would be designed <br />
by some IBM guys. This was their revenge. <br />
<br />
<br />
We thought that this was stupid - refusing to run <br />
these hard-won windows apps, shooting ourselves in the foot before OS/2 <br />
was even coded! But it was the price for getting IBM on board and we <br />
figured that - with IBM and Microsoft together, and the 640K crunch <br />
looming, that the success of OS/2 would appear so inevitable to the ISVs that <br />
they'd write for it anyhow and the success feedback would be started. <br />
Now you know why the OS/2 windowing API even puts the screen origin at <br />
a different corner! They wanted to be as different from Windows as they <br />
could as a matter of personal vendetta. <br />
<br />
<br />
OK, as we know, the 640K pressure was helped a lot by DOS extenders, <br />
386 machines quickly took over from 286 machines, and IBM and MS were <br />
left with a product that wasn't going anywhere fast. We also didn't <br />
have application critical mass. So we started on OS/2 2.0, together, <br />
a couple of years later than we should have. THis would be a 386 <br />
version, have good multiple DOS boxes, and hopefully pull the fat out of <br />
the fire. At roughly the same time our windows group - which was not <br />
our prime focus - was working on a 386 version, as well. <br />
<br />
<br />
The windows product - 3.0 - came out and did very well indeed. IBM <br />
was unhappy. They were unhappy cause they thought we were being disloyal <br />
to OS/2 by writing a competitor. And they were shitting bricks because it <br />
was their old enemy Windows - the ones that a lot of IBMers <br />
told there bosses would never be a success! MS's reaction to the Win 3 <br />
success was to say that OS/2 had to support the Win 3 API - that we'd <br />
then have a "low end" kernel - windows - and a high end kernel - OS/2 - <br />
to run the app base. IBM said that we either had to stop development of <br />
windows - not just as an OS/2 API, but completely - or <br />
we were fired from OS/2 the OS/2 project. <br />
<br />
<br />
We still believed OS/2 2.0 could be made a success. But Win 3.0 was <br />
*already* a big success. It seemed just stupid to us to kill a healthy <br />
animal in the hopes of nursing a sick one into recovery! So given that <br />
choice, we kept Windows and IBM kicked us out of the OS/2 team. Also <br />
note that IBM insisted on no Windows API in the product, so we'd have <br />
to drop Windows and abandon the apps. We'd seen how hard it was to <br />
build windows critical mass and to just shoot all of those apps, <br />
and all of those ISVs, and all of those users seemed completely out of <br />
the question. <br />
<br />
<br />
It's extremely ironic that within a few months, IBM was announcing that <br />
OS/2 2.0 would support the Windows API! It was for that that they <br />
kicked us out! It was clear that there are a lot more emotions then <br />
intellect running things over there, when they'd make a decision, let <br />
it drive a terrible divorce, and then un-make the decision a little while <br />
later! <br />
<br />
<br />
Why was IBM doing these random things? I dunno; they never invited me to <br />
their inner stragegy meetings. But I'd guess that they were driven too <br />
much by hatred of Windows, hatred of Bill Gates, envy at MS's success, etc. <br />
The hatred and envy of many of IBM's folks - even senior folks - is well <br />
documented in various books and articles. It's my opinion that they <br />
let their emotions cut off their noses to spite their faces. Their first <br />
goal wasn't for OS/2 to succeed, it was for Microsoft to fail. <br />
<br />
<br />
But here's the problem with OS/2 in a market where Windows has been <br />
very successful and has a big share. Win 3.0 had the critical <br />
market share, and OS/2 didn't. OS/2 could be a good platform to run <br />
Windows programs, but very few vendors would write for the OS/2 <br />
API. Why write for OS/2 and sell into a world of 5% of machines, when <br />
you can write for the Windows API and sell to *all* of them, OS/2 included! <br />
If OS/2 had some good features - like HPFS :-) - then folks could get <br />
the advantages while running Windows apps, you didn't need to use <br />
the OS/2 API to take advantage of HPFS, or the shell, or whatever. <br />
So there's no strong <br />
motivation for ISVs to hurt themselves by writing to the OS/2 API. <br />
<br />
<br />
hurt the good news for OS/2 is that - with it's WIN 3.0 support - it could <br />
run from a massive pool of applications and therefore be an interesting <br />
system to some customers, even in it's infancy. The bad news is that <br />
there'll never be a significant number of apps using the OS/2 API. <br />
<br />
<br />
So OS/2 could have a successful career as a "high end" windows engine. <br />
So that does IBM do? They come out with their infamous "Curtains for <br />
Windows" campaign! Microsoft controled the Windows standard. By that <br />
I mean that if we say that future versions of our OS's are going to <br />
have some new features - such as OLE - people take that seriously. <br />
Whereas if IBM decides to extend the Windows API - which they could <br />
easily do, from a technical standpoint - people know that only a small <br />
percentage of machines will be able to support that extension, so they <br />
won't use it, and it languishes. <br />
<br />
<br />
It's extremely hard to do development work on an operating system when <br />
someone else controls the standard. "Control" in this case is a matter <br />
of public perception. For example, Microsoft was once very big in the <br />
Unix world. In fact, we considered it our candidate for the future <br />
desktop operating system, when machines got powerful enough to run something <br />
good. We were the worlds biggest seller of Unix systems. DOS was, <br />
when we first wrote it, a one-time throw-away product intended to <br />
keep IBM happy so that they'd buy our languages. <br />
<br />
<br />
The UNIX contracts were all done when Bell Labs was regulated and couldn't <br />
sell Unix into the commerical marketplace. So although they wrote it <br />
and were paid royalties, they couldn't develop it in competition to us. <br />
But after a few years that changed. Bell was degregulated and now they <br />
were selling Unix directly, in competition to us! They might sell it for <br />
cheaper than we had to pay them in royalties! But that wasn't the real <br />
killer, the real killer was the Bell now controlled the standard. If <br />
we wrote an API extension that did X, and Bell wrote an incompatible one <br />
that did Y, which one would people write for? The ISVs know that AT&T <br />
was a very big company and that they'd written the original, so they'd <br />
believe that AT&T controlled the standard, not MS, and that belief would <br />
then define reality. So we'd always just be waiting for what AT&T announced <br />
and then frantically trying to duplicate it. <br />
<br />
<br />
Bill Gates knew, right away, that there was no <br />
strong future in Unix for us any more. Fortunately at that time, DOS <br />
was taking off and we were learning, along with everyone else, about <br />
the power of standards. So the primary OS team - the Unix guys - joined <br />
with the secondary OS team - the DOS guys - and the earliest versions <br />
of OS/2 were born. (This was before IBM came on board, so it wasn't called <br />
OS/2!) <br />
<br />
<br />
So to get back to the main track, IBM has a product which could become <br />
a successful windows executive. But they don't control the windows standard, <br />
Microsoft does. So a wise company would enter into some kind of formal <br />
or informal relationship with MS. MS would be helped by the presense of <br />
this high end windows executive - it makes the windows API more attractive - <br />
and a cooperative venture would be born. But instead, *unbelievably* - <br />
IBM challenges us publicly to a fight to the death! "Curtains for windows", <br />
indeed! Yes, IBM could add WIN 3.0 support because they had the WIN 3.0 <br />
source code, but their contract which gave them that source was due to <br />
expire soon! The entire survival of OS/2 as a product depends upon that <br />
contract, and their nasty ads, their character assasinations (Hi, J. Soyring!) <br />
and their "curtains for windows" didn't leave much chance of our ever <br />
extending their contract! <br />
<br />
<br />
Why do this crazy thing? Again, I speculate that they let their envy <br />
at our success, and their anger over their own past failures, warp their <br />
thinking. They wanted to hurt us more than they wanted to help themselves. <br />
Also, IBM grew up in the days when it had a stranglehold on the industry <br />
and they dreamed of returning to that stranglehold. The Microchannel <br />
was intended to achieve that, but it failed. Now if they could own the <br />
only OS standard they could use that to leverage their hardware and <br />
regain dominance in both fields. The brilliance of the prospect of <br />
returning to their past glories blinded them to the fact that it wouldn't <br />
work. <br />
<br />
<br />
So that's where Microsoft has been sitting for the past two or three <br />
years. Every few months I read some c.o.o.a and I marvel at all of <br />
the folks there that just don't get it. They argue about how OS/2 now has <br />
a 3% market share, or is it 5%, and they think that that means anything. <br />
It's like two race cars - one with hundreds of gallons of gas - and <br />
a 20 lap lead - and the other way behind with only a cup of gas. And <br />
it's proponents are crowing that it's slowly gaining! <br />
<br />
<br />
Also, I see folks argue about the sales figures <br />
that show that OS/2 apps don't sell worth a darn, try to deny the fact that <br />
there aren't very many widely interesting OS/2 apps available. Nobody <br />
seems to understand why there aren't - and won't be - big draw OS/2 apps <br />
available. And people think that the "5%" penetration number contradicts <br />
the "no OS/2 apps sold" number. Every time I'd marvel at how folks <br />
could just look at it in the face and not understand what that means. <br />
<br />
<br />
It means that OS/2 is selling, however well it does, as a Windows engine. <br />
That's why some number of copies have been sold, but very few OS/2 <br />
API apps were sold along side. <br />
<br />
<br />
So OS/2 is a windows engine, <br />
and that engine is going to jump the tracks each time an improved <br />
Windows ships. It will take IBM two or three years to reverse engineer <br />
the new stuff, and by that time MS will have it's *next* release out. <br />
You can't establish your own direction, and you can't play catch up. <br />
It's just an untennable position. MS refused to get into that position <br />
with AT&T, yet IBM burned all of it's other bridges *before* it crossed <br />
them. The only way to live in that kind of a situation is to cooperate <br />
with the company that controls the standard, not slander and belittle it. <br />
<br />
<br />
The only thing that interested me about this was making bets with my friends <br />
on how long it would be before Lou Gestner wised up. Mr. Gestner, whom <br />
I don't personally know, is clearly a very sharp guy. But he was a <br />
cookie salesman and didn't understand the kind of dynamics I've discussed <br />
above. He had to take the word of underlings - guys who spun crazy <br />
tales of somehow overthrowing Microsoft, IBM regaining it's rightful <br />
position as ruler of the world, "curtains for windows", and the <br />
incredible profits that would come from an IBM stranglehold. It sounds <br />
good if you don't understand the real underlying dynamics, and IBM <br />
desparately needs major new profit centers, so these guys convinced <br />
Gestner to support them. <br />
<br />
<br />
But, as I've said, while Gestner was ignorant, he isn't dumb. And he <br />
won't be ignorant forever. Eventually he'll come to realize that <br />
the OS/2 emperor has no clothes. So me and my friends would occasionally <br />
speculate when that might be - 6 months, 12 months, 24 months, etc. <br />
There was no doubt *what* would happen, it was just a matter of *when*. <br />
<br />
<br />
Clearly, Gestner has reached that point. First, note that IBM said that <br />
they weren't even going to try to modify OS/2 for the new WIN95 APIs. <br />
That means that they don't want to launch a 2 year product because <br />
they figure there'll be nothing there in 2 years to run that API. <br />
IBM has to run behind Microsoft playing "catch up", and they've stopped <br />
running and are walking slowly, panting. This is a critical sign. <br />
<br />
<br />
Secondly, Gestner is saying publicly that the OS battle is the "previous <br />
<br />
<br />
battle" and that groupware is now where he should fight. I won't argue <br />
with that, but this is as clear a statement as you'll ever find that they've <br />
given up on OS/2 as a mainstream desktop system. It's not curtains for <br />
windows, but curtains for OS/2. For anyone who has eyes to see, IBM <br />
has thrown in the towel on OS/2 as a mainstream, successful operating system. <br />
They'll continue to support it for the folks who are using it as a <br />
dedicated platform. But that won't go far or for very long, IMHO. <br />
<br />
<br />
There are two problems. First, it's my uneducated guess that they can't <br />
even turn a positive cash flow developing it for dedicated platforms. <br />
Even if they just write off the billions blown, IBM is not an efficient <br />
developer and they'll have a hell of a lot of programmers writing and <br />
supporting it. At one time in the past IBM might have lost money for <br />
10 years as a strategic move to increase customer confidence in IBM <br />
support. But as their mainframes start melting seriously IBM won't be <br />
able to afford such luxuries. It's my guess - and again, I admit that <br />
this is outside of my area of expertise - that there'll be a lot of <br />
scouts-honor promises, but that after a few years of loosing money <br />
IBM will phase out of OS/2 altogether, one way or another. Note that they <br />
*have* to spend a lot of money developing it, even for this niche. Otherwise <br />
stuff like NT - which is so much cheaper because of the larger number <br />
of copies - is too attractive. NT, for example, would have the latest <br />
technology and a stagnant OS/2 wouldn't. NT would have the latest tools <br />
and compilers, and a stagnant OS/2 wouldn't. So even as a niche system, <br />
OS/2 can't be just milked, it has to continue to undergo development. <br />
And it will be damned hard for anyone, especially IBM, to make money <br />
doing that. <br />
<br />
<br />
So, in a few nutshells, that's it. IBM doomed OS/2 years ago when <br />
they said it was "us or them". Folks at MS walked around with their <br />
mouths hanging open for days - we couldn't believe that IBM was that <br />
dumb. And now you see the result. OS/2 is dead as a general purpose <br />
operating system. And I, for one, am highly skeptical of it's longevity <br />
as a dedicated platform. <br />
<br />
<br />
Gordon Letwin <br />
not a Microsoft spokesperson <br />
<br />
<br />
p.s. - please note that all of this is my personal opinion. I don't <br />
set or participate in Microsoft strategy, I'm just a programmer. <br />
None of this represents Microsoft's view of the situation, either <br />
formally or informally. <br />
<br />
<br />
But I'm not dumb, and I can read the facts in front of my eyes. Note that <br />
I, along with the other initial Microsofties, could see the oncoming <br />
micro revolution back when the 8080 first came out. That's why I <br />
switched from supercomputers to microcomputers. <br />
<br />
<br />
So I have a good track record at being able to see the obvious. Even <br />
when the obvious was *not* obvious to the rest of the industry, like <br />
IBM, DEC, et. al. <br />
</pre></div>Neozeed